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ABSTRACT 
INFORMATION for all those involved in research but OVERLOADIS A PROBLEM 
seems especially threatening to interdisciplinary research. Teamwork 
supplies the remedy, but most research in the social sciences and hu- 
manities is done by scholars working alone. That fact limits the scope for 
interdisciplinary work. In this article, we examine several ways in which 
actual and potential overload affects research choices for the solo re-
searcher, paying special attention to the creation of ad hoc idiosyncratic 
specialties. As a matter of policy, should solo interdisciplinary work be 
encouraged? A strong social preference for interdisciplinarity might dis- 
courage solo practice as just another example of the huge disparity be- 
tween individual and collective capacities. 
TWEOF OVERLOAD 
Everyone engaged in research is aware of the problem of informa-
tion overload. It is always a threat if not a reality. It is perhaps most 
familiar as a problem of maintaining currency. A basic requirement for 
the maintenance of expertise, and of a reputation for expertise, is that of 
staying current-i.e., keeping up with what other research workers are 
doing that is relevant to one’s own work (Wilson, 1993). One wants to be 
able to claim intellectual command of a field, and this requires deep and 
wide knowledge of what has been done and is being done by others in 
the field. Just how wide and how deep one’s knowledge must be is not 
something on which there are (or could be) any precise rules, and it is 
very clear that wide differences in the scope of current knowledge will be 
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found among different people working in the same area. But the re- 
quirement is there and ordinarily means that one must devote time and 
effort to reading what others have published or are going to publish or 
have otherwise communicated. How much time is needed will vary with 
the size and level of activity of the field-a small field of slow producers 
will present no problem of keeping up; a large and very active field of fast 
producers may tax or overwhelm one’s capacities. Specialization in re- 
search is partly a response to, and defense against, overload-i.e., one 
adjusts the size of the field over which one hopes to maintain expertise so 
that the burden of keeping up is manageable. The fieId cannot any longer 
be the size of a conventionally recognized discipline; even in philoso- 
phy, not an especially populous discipline, it has long been impossible 
for American philosophers to keep up with what their colleagues were 
writing, says Nicholas Rescher (1993), and philosophy “which ought by 
mission and is by tradition an integration of knowledge, has itself be- 
come increasingly disintegrated” (p. 730). As time goes on, one may 
discover the necessity of narrowing one’s scope: “Every scientist who has 
been in business for a long period knows perfectly well that in order to 
remain an expert in some area he has to cut down the width of his inter- 
ests more or less continuously” (Bar-Hillel, 1963, p. 96). This is by no 
means the only thing that limits the size of an individual researcher’s 
area of expertise, but limiting width of interest is definitely unavoidable 
and increasingly important. 
A different problem of overload arises in the context of particular 
inquiries or research projects. Here the problem is the overabundance 
of available data relevant to the particular inquiry-i.e., experimental 
results, field observations, historical records, statistical and survey data, 
and the like. Data may be scanty in one case but torrential in another to 
the point that no one could hope to analyze and evaluate them all or 
integrate them into a coherent picture, even supposing that there were 
no problems of locating and assembling them in the first place (Wilson, 
1994). The kind of overload involved in maintaining currency we might 
call “upkeep” overload-the price of maintaining the intellectual capital 
that is the research worker’s chief asset; the kind of overload presented 
by information relevant to a particular inquiry we might call “task over-
load (the two kinds will frequently overlap). 
In both cases there are a variety of ways of coping with overload. A 
certain amount of upkeep overload may be accepted as normal, though 
inevitably leading to nonuse of relevant, but less than top-priority, infor- 
mation. Task overload can be dealt with by the adoption of strategies of 
inquiry that allow the elimination or ignoring of huge categories of rel- 
evant information (Wilson, 1995). In both cases, one consequence of 
overload is that relevant information does not get used. Whether or not 
this is a problem, it does seem a clear failure to meet conventional stan- 
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dards of rationality, which call for the use of all available relevant infor- 
mation. The conventional understanding is reflected in statements like: 
“These estimates are rational, in the sense of taking account of all avail- 
able information” (Elster, 1989, p. 109) or: “The common understand- 
ing [of the term ‘rationality’] is ... the complete exploitation of informa- 
tion, sound reasoning, and so forth” (Arrow, 1987, p. 206). So overload 
is of theoretical, as well as of practical, interest; one cannot simply disre- 
gard the fact of large-scale ignoring of relevant information if that is what 
happens in research. Of course it is of both practical and theoretical 
interest to library and information studies, where the chief criterion of 
success in information retrieval has been the provision of all and only 
relevant information, a goal that loses some of its allure in the face of 
persistent problems of overload. 
OVERLOADAN  TEAMWORK 
How does the matter of overload affect the possibility and the actual- 
ity of interdisciplinary research? Interdisciplinarity must, at the very least, 
involve the use of the knowledge and skill involved in two specialties from 
different disciplines, and for the moment we will assume that the interest- 
ing cases are those involving the application of expertise in the two spe- 
cialties, not an insider’s knowledge of one specialty and an outsider’s 
knowledge of a second, Is there something about interdisciplinary work 
that raises especially troubling problems of overload? There is a quick 
answer to this question: it all depends on how narrowly the burden is 
concentrated. A group of workers can easily do what a single individual 
would find impossible. Think of the process of drawing up requirements 
for a research project-i.e., skills required, bodies of knowledge needed, 
as well as facilities and equipment needed. There is no theoretical limit 
to the number and variety of specialties that might be specified in the 
cognitive budget, and no problem of bringing them to bear on a single 
project if each different specialty can be contributed by a different indi- 
vidual. You can add an ethicist if you need one, an expert in witchcraft, a 
deconstructionist, and a risk assessor. You can add information special- 
ists to search the literature, and literature specialists to serve as desig- 
nated readers, reporting to others on what they need to know of the lit-
erature. Each specialist may continue to face the problem of upkeep 
overload, but the problem need not be exacerbated by the social situa- 
tion of working on a team; indeed it may well be mitigated (if for in- 
stance there are others to serve as filters to screen out literature one need 
not bother to examine). And while the problem of task overload may be 
horrendous-if, for instance, the task is to explore real social problems 
and find plausible solutions-still it can be treated as a collective prob- 
lem, not an individual one. So the conduct of research by teams or groups 
is a way of increasing the amount of expertise and information that can 
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be brought to bear on a problem without increasing the burden of over- 
load on the participating individuals. This is not to avoid the problem of 
information overload entirely, but at least it makes it possible to do what 
overload would otherwise make impossible. 
INTERDISCIPLINARYAND THE SOLOISTWO K 
The place to look for the real trouble in interdisciplinary research is 
in the work of the lone researcher-the soloist. While research and de- 
velopment in natural science and technology is increasingly done by 
groups, solo research still predominates in the humanities and social sci- 
ences. Research in natural sciences and applied fields is increasingly col- 
lectivized or industrialized (Weinberg, 1972; Ziman, 1981, 1983, 1987), 
but humanities and social sciences are still predominantly areas for the 
cottage industry-i.e., inexpensive small-scale production involving little 
or no staff or equipment or logistical support. This may be the chief 
reason why interdisciplinary research often seems so problematic in the 
humanities and social sciences: it is problematic where the organization 
of research, the mode of production, makes it so. 
The many specialties in the various social science disciplines are all 
trying to produce information relevant to the understanding of concrete 
social phenomena-and they do not always fail. But separately they at 
best elucidate a part or side or aspect or feature of some element of the 
social world, and it is not hard to see why a student of society would aspire 
to a better understanding of society than can be got by work within a 
single specialty. “There is scarcely an individual phenomenon or event 
in society with which we can deal adequately without knowing a great 
deal of several disciplines ...” (Hayek, 1956, p. 464). Understanding so-
cial reality requires crossing or ignoring disciplinary boundaries. The 
problem is that the number of specialties contributing relevant informa- 
tion is likely to be very large, and the quantity of information provided 
far beyond the capacity of any individual to absorb and use-in a word, 
overload. Staying within disciplinary boundaries means giving up trying 
to understand concrete phenomena; not giving up means facing intrac- 
table overload. Compromise is unavoidable and may easily recede from 
consciousness; Hayek (1956) suggested that: “We are probably so used to 
this impossibility of knowing what we ideally ought to know that we are 
rarely fully aware of the magnitude of our shortcomings” (p. 464). 
Cultural studies are in a similar position, as David Damrosch (1995) 
illustrates: 
I spent twenty years, beginning in college, trying to learn everything 
I needed to know to work on the things I wished to study. The prob- 
lem was that I was loyal to too many interests, in several ancient and 
modern literatures, in literary theory, in biblical studies, in history, 
archaeology, anthropology, and art history. A reasonable enough 
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constellation of interests, but in the advanced state of modern schol- 
arship it is inherently unmanageable, if one wants to be seriously 
engaged with scholarly work ...I have learned that I do, sometimes, 
need to sleep. Worse, my memory simply isn’t good enough to hold 
in mind everything that would be necessary for full-scale 
multidisciplinary work. (pp. 15-16) 
Damrosch found that he had set himself too ambitious a task. Overload 
did turn out to be an insurmountable problem. 
The obvious fact that there are limits to an individual’s capacity to 
utilize information does not, however, imply that interdisciplinarity is ruled 
out for the solo practitioner. Even though individual capacity is limited, 
no scholar or scientist need stick tojust one specialty, but rather they may 
simultaneously work in two or more (and of course may move from one 
to another-i.e., a serial specialist). There is no standard size of specialty 
(for that matter, there is no agreed way of identifying and distinguishing 
specialties), and a person may be perfectly capable of maintaining exper- 
tise in more than one though not in dozens. Is there reason to think that 
it is harder to maintain currency in two specialties if they are in different 
disciplines than if they are in the same discipline? N‘ould it be harder to 
keep up with streams of literature, one in sociology and one in political 
science, than to keep up with two streams of literature within sociology? 
There is no obvious reason to think so. It may be harder to attain exper-
tise in a new specialty if it is in a new discipline (new to the learner). 
However, given that one has somehow attained expertise in specialties in 
different disciplines, the fact that they are in different disciplines does 
not itself imply anything about how hard it will be to keep up. In any 
given case, overload may be a problem, but then the same may be true 
for maintaining currency in multiple specialties (or even a single spe- 
cialty) within a single discipline. 
So overload does not rule out the kind of solo interdisciplinary re- 
search that requires expertise in at least two specialties in different disci- 
plines, if we consider only the case of the research worker who has some- 
where and somehow already achieved expertise in the different special- 
ties and consider only the problem of keeping up (task overload can arise 
anywhere). But it is different when we consider the worker who proposes 
to enter interdisciplinary work, say in mid-career, by acquiring expertise 
in a new specialty in another discipline and using it in conjunction with 
already acquired knowledge. People do change disciplines in mid-career 
and, if one can change disciplines, one can add them too. This is not a 
quick and easy task; entry into a specialty is harder than keeping up in it 
once one has entered, and entry into a specialty in a new discipline is 
likely to be very much harder than adding a specialty in one’s home disci- 
pline. It will also take time-from months to several years (see Ziman, 
1987, for relevant information on this and closely related matters). Still, 
WILSON/RESEARCH AND INFORMATION OVERLOAD 197 
it is certainly not out of the question, and so it is worth considering what 
makes it more or less difficult to do. 
ENTRYBARRIERS 
There are some obvious features that affect ease of entry into a specialty 
(remember that we are still thinking of the attainment of expertise as it would 
be judged by already established practitioners). First is the extent of the 
prerequisites for gaining competence in the new specialty-the background 
knowledge needed by any competent worker in the new specialty and the 
tools to be acquired elsewhere and brought to work in the specialty. If one 
does not already satisfy the prerequisites, entry may be almost out of the 
question--e.g., if work in the specialty assumes scholarly knowledge of sev- 
eral ancient languages, those without prior knowledge will usually find entry 
too costly. (Mathematics can serve as a similar impassable barrier; this is one 
reason it is generally easier to move from a hard to a soft specialty than vice 
versa.) But not every specialty has demanding prerequisites. 
Other factors influencing an individual’s entry into a new specialty 
are the age and size of the literature of the field. The entrant has to catch 
up not only with the current practitioners of the specialty but also with 
the literature, and that will be easier if the specialty is new and has practi- 
cally no literature yet. (The physicist Eugene Wigner [1950] wrote that: 
“Today, we are neglecting the theory of solids in which a student has to 
study perhaps six hundred papers before he reaches the frontiers and 
can do research on his own; we concentrate instead on quantum electro- 
dynamics in which he has to study six papers” [p. 4231.) Menard (1971) 
discusses at some length the barriers to entry into new and old fields in 
terms of the size of the literature to be worked through. Next is the sheer 
intellectual difficulty or complexity of the new specialty itself; it may be, 
as a critic said of research in diffusion of innovations, a mile wide and an 
inch deep, or it may be subtle and intellectually dense, requiring huge 
investments of time for mastery. (Ian Stewart [1992] is critical of applied 
mathematicians in perturbation theory for not adopting a technique de- 
veloped in mathematical logic but then notes that the new technique 
requires “a distinctly different cast of mind, a new style of thinking that 
takes several years to get used to” [p. 1141. Little wonder they are not 
rushing to adopt it.) A further feature is the degree of codification of 
the field-i.e., whether text books and serious expositions of an agreed 
body of knowledge will bring one up reasonably close to the research 
front, or whether one has to organize knowledge for oneself on the basis 
of the original literature of the field. Given that work at the front is 
disorganized in all fields (CoIe, 1992), the codified field (roughly, the 
hard as opposed to the soft field, often but not always the natural and 
formal science as opposed to the social science and humanities field) 
offers less of a burden to overcome. 
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All of these are features of the new specialty that affect the likelihood 
that overload will prevent entry. This is task overload; performing the 
task is, of course, at the same time investing in new intellectual capital, 
and the size of the task is a measure of the size of the investment. If one 
will have to spend a great deal of time acquiring prerequisite competen- 
cies-i.e., acquiring a new style of thought, organizing the content of the 
specialty for oneself, and/or catching up with a huge literature-the 
chances are good that one will consider alternatives to the acquisition of 
a new area of expertise. Uphill work like this would require special in- 
ducements; the natural gradient or direction of movement will be to- 
ward new fields without heavy prerequisites (or with prerequisites already 
met) that are relatively easily detached from other specialties in their 
discipline. But if what one wants is to work in a specialty that unfortu- 
nately has a big disorganized literature, heavy prerequisites, and so on, 
all is not lost, for there are alternatives-many of them-to an attempt to 
gain full expertise. One alternative is collaboration. Damrosch (1995) 
devotes a volume to arguing the merits of collaboration in the humani- 
ties and social sciences in the face of an “archaic hyperindividualism” (p. 
7), an entrenched prejudice against anything except lonely research. 
Collaboration produces a small team and has the expected effect of re- 
ducing the pressure of overload and increasing the size of the field that 
can be worked. But there are still numerous alternatives for the soloist. 
One of these is ad hoc interdisciplinary specialties. 
ADHoc INTERDISCIPLINARYSPECIALTIES 
Rather than attempt to become an expert in an established specialty 
in another discipline (as expertise would be judged by the practitioners 
already in the field), one can try something else. One can design a new 
ad hoc idiosyncratic interdisciplinary specialty, with a specially delimited 
subject matter and specially formulated conceptual and theoretical basis, 
research questions to be pursued, techniques and methods to be em- 
ployed, type and style of result to be aimed at. In practice, one is perhaps 
more likely to develop such a specialty piecemeal and instinctively rather 
than as a result of deliberate planning, but it is the sort of thing that 
could be planned. The new specialty may incorporate fragments or ma- 
jor fractions of existing specialties but need not correspond to anybody’s 
understanding of a pre-existing specialty. So, for example, one could be 
“drawing on work in psychology, cognitive science and history of science 
as well as epistemology and philosophy of science” (Solomon, 1992, p. 
453, describing her own work). Some of the prerequisites associated 
with preexisting “outside” specialties may be skirted and simply worked 
around by deliberately setting out to do what can be done with big gaps 
in knowledge. (One of Bazerman’s subjects [Bazerman, 1988, p. 2441 
says that his field is so interdisciplinary that he inevitably must live with 
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vast areas of “relevant ignorance,” and this may be accepted as the price 
one pays for easier and cheaper employment of a specialty.) 
The full design specifications of the new specialty would include a 
policy on information use covering types of data to be used as evidence 
and bodies of already existing literature to be relied upon. The policy 
might direct one to discard or ignore much of what has already been 
done in one or more of the fields from which the new specialty is con- 
structed. Large literatures may be cut down drastically: one may ignore 
the past, ignore “foreign” contributions, ignore contributions from iden- 
tifiable schools and traditions of thought (e.g., no Marxists, no 
deconstructionists, no positivists, etc.) ,ignore work done with certain tech- 
niques or in particular styles or with particular approaches. Creation of a 
new ad hoc specialty may be the occasion for an idiosyncratic definition 
of “what is living and what is dead” in the specialties involved. 
Whether creation of such an ad hoc idiosyncratic specialty is likely to 
be acceptable to others or even possible at all clearly depends on the 
intellectual environment. If it requires resources under others’ control 
(e.g., money, research facilities), it will not be possible at all unless those 
others are persuaded that it is more desirable than alternative uses of the 
resources. This is one basis of social control on knowledge production. 
Even where resources are no impediment, intellectual acceptance may 
be; editors must be persuaded to publish, reviewers must not denounce 
the results. Acceptance may be denied to work perceived as heterodox 
or nonstandard-notjust of poor quality, but of the wrong sort entirely- 
a second basis of social control. Both bases of control are generally stron- 
ger in the natural sciences than in the social sciences and humanities: 
research in the former is more dependent on expensive facilities and 
equipment, and agreement about what counts as acceptable work is gen-
erally greater. Stephen Fuchs (1992,1993)argues plausibly that, in weakly 
controlled fields of inquiry, it is particularly easy to create new specialties; 
such fields tend to be fragmented, and further fragmentation is not re- 
sisted. As it happens, the weak fields he is thinking of are the social sci- 
ence and humanities fields where soloists predominate. If this is right, 
creation of ad hoc interdisciplinary fields is easiest exactly where it is 
most wanted to satisfy the soloist. 
Even if social controls permit creation of such new idiosyncratic special- 
ties, work in any particular new specialty may be rejected by others as a cari- 
cature or desecration, as involving distortions or misunderstandings of ill- 
assimilated specialized work, and so on (compare Klein, 1990,p. 88 on stan-
dard criticisms of borrowing), or the new specialty may turn out to be widely 
appreciated but essentially inimitable, remaining a unique soloist style, or it 
may actually attract imitators and grow into a new establishment. 
Such specialty creation is not as radical as it may sound. Indeed, the 
world of research may actually be filled with unrecognized or unacknowl- 
edged idiosyncratic specialties, developed quite unintentionally in the 
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course of accumulating whatever special knowledge and skills seem to be 
needed to do the job one has undertaken. And an ad hoc interdiscipli- 
nary specialty will differ only in degree from a single-discipline specialty 
modified by the import of concepts, tools, methods from outside, or partly 
transformed by outside influence. Modification of research practice by 
import and under outside influence goes on all the time in research; it 
might even seem that every specialist would constantly be open to influ- 
ence from outside and eager to import useful tools. But specialists differ 
enormously in their interest in, and openness to, influences from other 
specialties in the same or in different disciplines, and their practices will 
reflect such differences. In fact, we can imagine-and find-specialists 
who practice what we can call informationally closed specialization-i.e., 
ignoring everything done outside the specialty itself, confining one’s in- 
formation intake to that produced by fellow specialists. The very idea of 
such an informationally closed practice may seem perverse, but we have 
no reason to think that it cannot exist and yield valuable results (for a 
different view, see Wilson, 1996). Microanalysis of the information use 
component of research practices would reveal a continuum of types of 
solo practice ranging from the narrowest informationally closed special- 
ization to the full interdisciplinary practice based on expert knowledge 
of specialties in two or more disciplines, with a huge range of intermedi- 
ate types representing greater or lesser isolation from, or involvement 
with, other specialties and other disciplines. This may look like a source 
of wild variation in an otherwise standardized and stabilized world of 
specialties, but the standardization and stability are mirages. While spe- 
cialties no doubt differ in this regard, any specialist is likely to be more 
concerned with some parts of his specialty than others, more interested 
in some techniques and concepts than others, more convinced about some 
outcomes of research than colleagues are, and so on. And each specialist 
will bring to the work a unique repertory of intellectual resources 
(Ghiselin, 1989). We should expect to find that the practitioners of a 
single specialty all define their specialty somewhat differently and prac- 
tice it somewhat differently. Just as each individual’s language constitutes 
an idiolect slightly different from everyone else’s, so each specialist’s ex- 
pertise constitutes a research idiolect slightly different from everyone 
else’s. As for stability, John Ziman (1985) has emphasized that “at the 
subfield level, there are no really stable specialties at all ...all is in flux” 
(p. 12). 
THESOLOIST POLICYAND KNOWLEDGE 
With all the variety of practice, the crucial fact remains that the solo-
ist is limited-whether practicing within the boundaries of established 
specialties or working across boundaries-by what single individuals can 
manage. The simple desire to do interdisciplinary research does nothing 
to increase one’s capacity to utilize information or to lessen the burden 
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of overload. Research whose success requires the application of mul- 
tiple specialized bodies of knowledge and skill and the utilization of vast 
quantities of information simply has to be done by teams, not by soloists. 
Serious large-scale interdisciplinary work is not for the soloist. 
Still one could ask whether, as a matter of social policy on knowledge 
production, a soloist’s effort to do interdisciplinary work is always to be 
encouraged over work within the limits of a single specialty. Perhaps 
single specialists should always join teams, and solo practice be reserved 
for interdisciplinary workers. (Granted that there is no such thing as an 
articulated social policy on knowledge production, there certainly could 
be; science policy is not an unfamiliar idea, and the social policy in ques- 
tion would be a generalization beyond science narrowly construed. See 
Kitcher, 1993, especially chapter 8, “The Organization of Cognitive La- 
bor,” and Fuller, 1993.) Is small-scale interdisciplinary work, of the size 
of which the soloist is capable, to be socially encouraged? Is full exper- 
tise-based interdisciplinary work to be considered more valuable than 
informationally closed work? And is this work more valuable than the 
other varieties of practice we have roughly sketched? Should solo inter- 
disciplinary work be encouraged as a matter of policy by those in a posi- 
tion to affect the career choices of students and beginning researchers? 
Should educational institutions, foundations, and professional societies 
do what they can to encourage interdisciplinary work and discourage 
informationally closed solo practice? It is clear, for instance, that if such 
work is to be encouraged, students must be urged to start early, for we 
have seen how difficult it can be to add a new specialty in mid-career. A 
real social preference for interdisciplinary work could lead to a real policy 
with clear consequences for action. 
But a real social preference for interdisciplinary work might instead 
lead to the end of private practice in research and the institution of team- 
work everywhere. If one takes seriously that putative requirement of ra- 
tionality for the use of all available relevant information, teamwork be- 
comes unavoidable, for individuals cannot meet the requirement. (As 
far as the individual is concerned, it cannot actually be a requirement- 
one cannot require the impossible-but at most an unrealizable ideal, a 
“regulative ideal” of the sort proposed by Immanuel Kant that, though 
unrealizable, still provides an orientation for practice [Emmet, 1994, pp. 
16-17].) Rather than encouraging soloists to do interdisciplinary work, 
we would urge them to join teams, contributing whatever knowledge and 
skill they happen to have to joint projects. 
As we cannot realistically expect such a drastic reorganization of re- 
search in the social sciences and humanities, might we not still argue in 
favor of a general preference for interdisciplinary work by soloists on the 
grounds that i t  goes in the right direction-i.e., toward increasing 
utilization of relevant information and other cognitive resources-even 
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when it fails to go all the way, as it always must if done by a soloist? But 
“going in the right direction” may not be the best plan; success may call 
for indirection. The great successes of the natural sciences have been 
based not on scrupulous utilization of all available relevant information 
about natural phenomena but on systematic simplification, idealization, 
abstraction, approximation, and the concomitant ignoring of very large 
quantities of admittedly relevant information (Wilson, 1995 and works 
cited there). One may well want to reply that what counts as success in 
the humanities and in at least parts of the social sciences is so different 
from what counts as success in natural science and engineering that strat- 
egies of inquiry successful in the latter cannot guide the former. This 
might not be enough to warrant making the encouragement of maxi-
mum solo interdisciplinary work a social policy. Even if we praised solo 
interdisciplinary work for having its heart in the right place, we might 
hope for greater success from a system of inquiry in which individual 
workers narrowed their scope while contributing to a collaborative result 
beyond the capacity of any of them singly. 
That sort of system is, in any case, the actual, the unavoidable one; 
we have been arguing at the margin over a little more or a little less. The 
gross disparity between individual and collective scope in research is noth- 
ing special but simply another manifestation of the general situation of 
the individual in the face of the collective cultural product, much empha- 
sized long ago by the sociologist-philosopher Georg Simmel. Simmel 
noted that: “No cultural policy can eliminate the tragic discrepancy be- 
tween objective culture, with its unlimited capacity for growth, and sub- 
jective culture, which can grow only slowly” (Simmel, 1976,p. 251) and 
described the “typical problematic situation of modern man” as that of 
“the feeling of being overwhelmed by this immense quantity of culture, 
which he can neither inwardly assimilate nor simply reject, since it all 
belongs potentially to his cultural sphere” (Simmel, 1976, p. 254). That 
is essentially the situation of the individual research worker in the world 
of research. 
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